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ABSTRACT
Monetary Disequilibrium, Black Market Exchange
Rate, and the Balance of Payments
by
Reza Kalantar , Doctor of Philosophy
Utah State University , 1983
Major Professor:

Dr. Basudeb Biswas

Department:

Economics

The ma in purpose of this study is to analyze theoreti cally and empirically the short - run dynamics of Iranian
reserve flows, black market exchange rate, and domestic rate
cf inflation.

To achieve this purpose , a monetary approach

was adopted to mea sure the simultaneous effect of an ex ante
excess flow supply of money on the three variables.
Th is study also attempts to test the hypothesis that in
the long run growth in output and price level is associated
with a balance of payments surplus , while growth in the
dom estically - determined portion of the money stock tends to
be associated with deficits.

The empirica l findings for the

longrun balance of payments shows that monetary author i ties
in Iran cannot control the change in the stock of internat ional reserves through domestic credit creation or destruc tion; rather, the authorities have a substant i al control over
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this var i able t h rough the mo n ey supply mult i plier .

In the

shor t run , mo netary imbalances do e xp lain the flow of inter nat ional reserves , whereas , domest ic infla tion is main l y
expla i ned by world in flat ion .

However , changes in the b l ack

market excha nge rate are solely de termined by factors outs i de
of the model.
(78 page s)

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
An Overview of the Iranian Exchange System
The basic legal framework of Iran ' s present foreign
trade policy was established under two acts during the 1930 ' s :
The Foreign Trade Monopoly Act of 1932 and the Foreign
Exchange Act of 1936 .

The original trade act (and its amend -

ment in 1941) gave the state a right to engage directly in ,
and be the sole agent for, the country ' s external commerce.
The government could, in fact, take full charge of the
country ' s total exports and i mports .

The exchange act,

revised in 1958, made the state the sole legal keeper of for ei g n exchange balances.

All export proceeds had to be sold

to the state, and all imports were subject to scrutiny and
"license" by the Exchange Commission .
Under Iran 's present exchange regi me , the rial is pegged
to the International Monetary Fund's Special Drawing Rights .
Special Drawing Rights were created after the introduction
of a " two - price system" for gold in 1968, a system that
separated official dealings from pr i vate dealing in gold .
The creation of Special Drawing Rights marked the first step
in the downgrading of the role of gold in International
finance .

Accompanying this decision of the world's major

central bankers (Belgium, Germany , Italy , the Netherlands,

Swit zerland , the United Kingdom , and the Un ited States) was
a decision to introduce a new reserve asset into the i nter national mone tar y s y ste m, be g inning in 1970 .

By mutual con-

sent of its memb er nations , the Int e rnational Mone tar y Fund
created the Spec i al Drawing Ri g hts (abbreviated SDRs and
of t en referred to as " paper go l d ") and distributed them am ong
its member s accord i ng to prea ssign ed quotas , with each SDR
e qual to one do llar .
The new econom i c pol icy announced by t he Un ited States
on Augus t 15 , 1971, closed the U. S . go l d wi ndow to fore i gn
cen tr a l ba nkers and u shered in a three - month per i od of freel y
fluc t uat inq e xchange rates .

Th is was followed by widespread

exchang e rate real i gnment and a deva luation of the dollar on
December 18 , 1971 (the Smithsoni an Agreeme nt) .

After fourteen

mon t hs of tur mo il on the i nternat ional financial mark e ts , in
the f irst week of February 1973 , the Un ited Stat e s pub lished
its prelimi nary balance on merchand is e trade fo r 1972 .

The

balance showed a substanti a l def i c it .
On Fe bruary 1 2 , 197 3 , the d ollar was de va·lued for t h e
secon d time; the inunediate effect was tha t some major Euro pean currencies i nagurated their " joint f loat " aga i ns t t he
d ollar.

Together wi th the f loa t ing yen and pound sterl i ng ,

t h is deve lopment made the dol l ar a f loa ti ng currency an d
effectively spelled the end of the Bretton Woods system .
The par va l ue of the Iranian rial was establ i shed in
1 957 at Rls . 75 . 75 per U. S . dol l ar.

Th i s rate was devalued

after an 8 .5 percent devaluat i on of the dollar in December

1971.

A new par value in terms of the SDR was thereafter

agreed upon with t he International Monetary Fund at Rls .
82 . 2425 per SDR based on a gold content of . 0108055 gram for
the rial .

With this rate intact after the second deprecia -

tion of the dollar in February 1973 , the rial/dollar rate was ,
in fact , upvalued by ten percent to Rls. 68.1747 .

In June

1973 , the rial ' s value went up again to Rls . 67 . 50perdollar.
In mid - 1974 , the International Monetary Fund adopted a
new system of va luation for the SDRs, one that is better
suited for an era of fluctuating exchange rates.

SDR value

is calculated daily as the weighted average value of a " bas ket" of 16 representative currencies, rather than in terms of
gold or dollars .
Since the dollar has a floating rate in financ i al mar kets and SDRs are stable in terms of the new valuation sys tem , on February 12 , 1975 , the rial/dollar peg was discon tinued , and the currency was directly pegged to the SDR.
Another reason for the discontinuation of the rial/dollar peg
was that the dollar is considered a reserve currency and thus
any depre ciation or appreciation of the dollar would have a
direct effect on the reserve posit i on of the Iranian economy.
Under the new exchange regime , t he ria l may f l uctuate
wi th i n 2 . 25 percen t

i n e i ther d i rect i on of its med i an exchange

rate in terms of the SDR : i.e. , Rls 82. 2 4 25 .

New rial /dol lar

exchange rates are to be fixed whenever the dol l ar / SDR rate
moves more than 2 . 25 percent in ei t her direction -- i . e .,
outside the rials 80 . 3920 - 84.0930 -- and remains outside
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these limits for five consecut i ve days .
Monetary Policy
The principal aim of Iran's mone tary policy and credit
policy as of 1977 was to assist the country ' s overa ll development effort within the framework of mo netary and price
stabil ity, and to provide a productive allocation of credit
supply .

Bank Ma rkazi, the Central Bank of Iran, is by law

charged with the formulation and implementation of overall
monetary and cred it policy.

To secure compliance with its

po licies and guidel ines , the bank has several specific sanctions at its d isposal, including den ial of rediscount and
fore i gn exchange facilities .

Direct sanctions g i ve the bank

enormous power to in fluence not only mone tar y aggregates ,
but also the allocation of resources i n spec i fic lines of
ac tivity.

The latter is achieved essentially by determi ning

the composition of cred it through a var iet y of measure s,
including acceptance of different types of paper , rationing
of credit , application of d i fferent rediscount rates and even
differentiation among borrowers .
Balance of Payments Trend
During Iran 's Fourth Development Plan (1958 - 1 972) , o i l
revenues increased at an annua l rate of approximately 200
percent and averaged approximately 75 perce nt of total for eign exchange receipts on current account .

Yet , unt i l

the

fourfo l d increase in the pos ted price of oil under the Kuwait
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and Tehran agreement (October and December 1973), and because
of the underva luation of the foreign exchange , t he increase
in annual petroleum revenues was not sufficient to cover
faste r - g rowing foreign exchange payments for i mported goods
and serv ices .
defic it.

The current account was thus in perenn i a l

The annual external sector deficits were normally

financed by foreign official borrow ing and other sources.
In t he 1973 - 1976 period, however , not only d i d the cur rent ac count show a sizable surplus (thu s obviat i ng any need
for external borrowing) , but also many of the previous loans
were repaid prior to their maturity .

In 1974 /75 the current

accoun t showed a hefty surplus of over $8 . 5 billion despite
the grea ter than 110 percent rise in fore i gn payments qver
the previous year and the 300 percent rise during 1972-73 .
The capital account position also showed a dramatic reversal
from a ne t in flow of nearly $925 million during 1973 - 74 to
a net outflow of $3254 million during 1974 - 75 (including
transfer payments and disbursements on b i lateral and mult ilateral commitments for fore i gn a id , loans , and inves tments) .
Accordingly, the overall balance of payment s registered a
surplus of over $5 b i llion .

The overall balance during 1975 -

76, however, showed a deficit of $991 mill i on and there was
a drawd own i n fore i gn exchan ge re s erves.
Petroleum revenues continue to play the predominant
role in Iran ' s trade and economic growth.

During the Fourth

Plan (1968 - 72) , oil revenues prov ided 52 percent of total
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annual public revenues .

Dur ing 1973 - 74, this ratio rose to

64 percent , and during 1975 - 76 to 80 percent .

Petroleum

exports accounted for 74 percent of Iran ' s foreign exchange
earnings during the five year period ending 1972 -7 3 .

During

1975 - 76 , the share rose to approximately 85 percent .
Objective of the Study
Much of the recent work on exchange rates is labeled
"monetary approach to the balance of payme nts " when the
exchange rate is officially fixed , and "monetary approach to
the exchange rate" when the exchange rate is floating .

In

the former case , money income (the price level) moves to
equilibrate the market for domestic goods and services , and
monetary policy is directed at the requirements of the for eign balance .

In the latter case , the rate of exchange

between two currencies move s to correct external disequili brium , and monetary policy is a i med at the goal of internal
stabilizat i on .
The Iranian economy has been experienc ing both types of
par ities during the last two decades .

The official exchange

rate is pegged , and all the i mpor t ers and exporters are
required to obtain and/or surrender all the foreign exchange
proceeds to the mone t ary authori ti es .

Because of the exis -

tence of exchange control , a black market has developed wit h
a flexible ra te of exchange for foreign currencies that has
a rate higher than the official rate and is determined
solely by the supply and demand for fore i gn money .
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On the basis of these considerations , one should ask :
(1)

To what extent should the central bank be concerned ,

in a f ix ed exchange rate system, about the abso lute l evel of
its reserves?

and (2)

To what extent can offsetting cen-

tral bank actions stabilize the balance of payments which i s
inherentl y unstable because of the existence of a black mar ket for fore ign money?

With these points in mind , this study :

(a) develops a mode l wh ich can analyze theoretically and
emp i rical l y the short-run dynamics of the Iranian balance of
payments , the black market exchange rate , and the domest i c
rate of inflation, and (b) applies a monetary approach based
on the theoretical background g i ven by Johnson
Frenke l

(19~7) ,

(1978) , Blejer (1977) , and others who have done con-

siderab l e work in these areas .

The departure of this study

from the analytical work of others lies in :

(1) its attempt

to provide a model which will test whether the monetary
approach i s capable of explaining the above var i ables in the
Iranian economy and measuring the simultaneous effect of a
mone tar y imbalance (ex ante excess flow supply of mo ney) on
the

Iranian balance of payments , black market exchange rate ,

and domest i c ra t e of inflation; and (2) its attempt to test
the hypo thesis that in the long run growth in output and
price level is associated with a balance of payments surplus,
wh i le gr owth in the domestically - determined portion of the
mo ney stock tends to be assoc i ated with deficits and reserve
outflows .
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Chapter I presented an overview of the Iranian exchange
system and the objectives of this study.

Chapter II pre-

sents alternative approaches to the balance of payments and
a review of the literature .

Chapter III deals with long-run

and short-run theoretical models on which this studyisbased.
The empirical section is presented in two parts:

Chap-

ter IV di scusses the real demand for money in Iran during
the per io d under analys i s and the money supply process , includ in g an analysis of the money mult i pl ier; Chapter V pre sents an analysis of the long - run behavior of reserve flows ,
black market exchange rates , and prices .
In the last chapter an attempt is made to estimate the
ef f ect of domes tic

monetary disequ ilibrium on the rate of

cha nge of foreign exchange reserves, the black market exch Enge rate , and the domestic rate of inflation.

The appen-

dix presents a graphic manipulation of supply and demand for
black market exchange rate and der i vat ion of the three
equations .

CHAPTER II
MONETARY, ELASTICITY, AND AB SORPTION APPROACHES
TO TilE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
The ma in feature of the monetary approach to the bal ance of paymen ts, as Johnson (1977) puts it, lies in the
propos iti on that t he balance of payments is a monetary
phenomenon .

The term , " bala nce of payment s," refers to the

it ems that are below t he line in the overall balance of pay ments , i . e . , the monetary approach concentra t es on the off icial settlement accounts and lumps everything else into a
single category , " items above t he line," Mussa ( 1 977 ).
The rules of double entry bookkeeping require that the
net sum of all items which appear above the line equal the
offical settlements balance , i. e ., the money account .

The

mone t ary approach attempts to provide a theory of the mon e y
account , i.e., on the trend of international reserve acqui s iti on or loss.

The approach i gnore s the compo siti on of the

ba l ance of payments between current accoun t , capital ac c ount,
and overal l ba lance, a s well as t he question of changes in
the structure of the balance of payment s ac counts t ha t may
occur as a count r y passes through var i ous stages of econom i c
growth .

The mone t ary approach emphas iz ed the d ir ec t

influ -

ence of excess demand for , or excess supply of , money on the
balance between income and ex p enditure, or more genera ll y ,
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between total acquisition and disposal of funds, whether
through production and comsumption or through borrowing and
lending -- therefore, on the overall balance of payments.
Surpluses in the trade account or capital account represent,
respectively, excess flow supplies of goods and of securities.

Surplus in the money account reflects the excess

domestic demand for money.
In analyzing the money account , or , more famil iarl y ,
the rate of incre ase or decrease in the country ' s international reserves, the monetary approach focu ses on the determinants of the excess domest ic flow demand for, or supplyof,
money .

It differs from the "elasticities" and "absorption "

approaches in introducing stocks as well as current expenditure flows into the adjustment process so that payment dis equil ibri um is transitor y and is conditional on domestic
monetary pol ic y .

The divergence between the mone t ary , elas-

ticity, and absorption approaches lies in the following
facts:
(1)

The so-called "a bsorp tion approach " .emphasizes the

rate of accumulation or decumu lation of fore ign assets (se curity plus money) .

The accumulat ion or decumulation of

assets d epends on the aggregate relationship between domestic expenditure and income, and does not depend upon the
composition of expenditure between exportables and importables, or between goods that, g i ven the price structure, are
classifiable into tradable and non-tradable goods .

Conse-

quently, though relative prices do influence the composition
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of expenditures , they p lay a secondary or negligible role in
the monetary approach ( as in the absorption approach) .

The

equality of the excess of domestic absorption over domestic
output and the current account deficit is the essenceofthe
absorption approach to the balance of payments .
(2)

The elastic i ty approach implies that relati v e

p rices will cause an increase or a decrease in domestic
demand f or exports on the assum ption that these increases or
decreases are matched by equal increases or decreases in
absorption .

The elasticity ap p roach views the exchangerate

as the relative prices of national monies .

It also assumes

that the exchange rate is determined by the conditions for
equilibrium in the markets for flows of funds, rather than
by the conditions for equili brium in the

marke~s

for stock

of assets .
The central propositions o f the "monetary a p proach" a r e ,
first , that the balance of payments i s a monetaryph e nomenon
that requires analysis with the tools of monetary theor y ,
not those of ba rter or "real" trade theory; second, that
money is a stock , whereas real theory traditionally deals
with flows , so that an adequate b alance of payments theory
must integrate stocks and flows; and third, that the money
stock can be changed in two alternative ways , through domest i c credit creation or destruction and through interna tional reserve flows , the policy choice being important to
balance of payments anlaysis .

The further purpose, parti -

cularly appropriate to balance of payments equilibrium
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defined as a policy problem , is to incorporate the role of
domestic monetary policy into the process of international
monetary adjustment , in contrast to alternative approaches
which treat monetary policy - sometimes inconsistently - as
affecting the economy by setting the real price , the rate
of interest, relevant to the determina ti on of flows of consumption and investment.

The essence of the " monetary approach" is most easily
understood by referring to Warla ' s Law, as used in contemporary theory , accordin g to which the sum of the excess
demands for goods, securities, and money is identically zero,
and an excess demand for money must be matched by an excess
supply somewhere else in the market system.

In a closed

economy, since the aggregate quantities of goods , securities, and money are fixed, excess demand and supply are
"potential " and not "actual," and must be eliminated by
adjustment of the two relative prices , namely the prices ,
in terms of money, of goods (the price level). and of bonds
( the interest rate) .

In an open economy , however , excess

demand and supply can be

eliminated by net purchases or

sales of goods or bonds for money in the international market .

Since net international flows of bonds and money

during a period alter the stocks initially available for
the next period, full equilibrium is not reached unt il such
net flows become zero (note that the analysis abstracts from
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economic growth) .

Such equilibr ium will be reached , provid -

ing the condit i ons for stability and un iqueness of interna tional monetary equ i librium are fulfilled , conditions which
have nothing to do wi th the elasticit i es of nat i onal excess
demand for , and s upply of , traded goods as funct i ons of their
real prices .
The monetary approach places emphasis on the foreign
assets whose accumulat i on or decumulation i s emphas i zed by
the absorption approach .
are:

(1)

The ma i n reasons for th i s emphasis

accumu l at i on of fore i gn assets

does not neces -

sar i ly imply the a c cumula ti on of mo ney through the balance
of payments ; it may mean t he opposite ; for example , when a
monetary po li cy of l ower i ng interest ra t e s leads t h e domes ti c asse t holders t o sh i ft t he i r funds from dom~ st i c to for eign securit i es;

(2)

i n a fixed - rate sys t em the monetary

author i ties are conce r ned with what changes the stock of
international reserves and how to prevent such changes;

( 3)

m9 netary authorit i es control the rate of change of domestic
cred it, wh i ch i s a componen t of the monetary base - the other
fac t or i s t he i n t e r nat i o n al reserves , therefore , the flow
supp l y of mo n ey .
The mone t ary approach to the balance of paymen t s con cen t rates on t he r ol e of money and other as s e t s i n de t er mi ning the balanc e of payments when the exchange rate i s
flex i b l e .

Becau se i t i s the re l ative pr i ce of two curren -

cies , t he equ i l i br i um exchange ra t e is atta i ned when the
exist i ng stock of two mon i es is willingly held .

It is
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reasonable, therefore, that a theory of the determination of
the relative pr ice of two currencies could be stated conven iently in terms of supply of, and demand for , these monies .
Review of Literature
The monetary approach deals with long-run equilibrium
situations when all relative pr ices are fixed.

Th is long -

run equilibrium view was studied and applied to test empir icall y the th eory for several countries , using the assump t ion that there are no ser i ous barriers to the international
movement of capita l and that all goods are traded .

These

assumptions i mp l y that good s and capital markets are per fectly arb itraged, and, ther efore , price level and interest
rates inallthe countries always move toge ther .
The re are several studies on this subject .
Bean (1976)

Donna L.

(Japanese case) used quarterly data and tested

the hypothesis that reserve accumulation is positively rela ted to the rate of growth of dome stic income and negatively
corre l ated with the rate of domest ic credit expansion .

J.

Richard Zecher (cited by Frenkel and Johnson , 1978 ) (Austrai lian case) and A. Hans Genberg (1977)

(Swedish case) used

quarterly data and tested the hypothesis that there is a link
between reserve flows and the domestic money stock and showed
that this is the avenue through which monetary equilibrium is
reached in an open economy .
Ma nual

Guitian

1978) investigated
balance

of

(cited
the

payments

by

Frenkel

relationship
and

th e

rate

and

between
of

Johnson ,
the

domestic
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credit expansion for the Spanish economy during 1955-1971.
His findings support the view that exchange rate changes are
not effective unless accompanied by appropriate credit poli cies .

The results of the tests also point out the importance

of central bank credit variables in the determ ination of the
balance of payments .

These findings , if accurate , are of

relevance from the policy point of view because the monetary
authorities can clearly control the rate of central bank
credit expansion .

Their control over this variable may en -

able the monetary authorities, for any g i ven

demandformone~

to attain their desired stock of international reserves.
The above empirical works can be found in J ohnson and
Frenkel ' s The Monet a ry Approach to the Balance of Payments
(1977) .

However , a s Alexander Swoboda (1977) puts it, if a

country has a low

d~gree

of capital mobili t y and avery large

proportion of non-traded to traded goods , its speed of adjustment to monetary imbalances will be reduced.

Although

the long - run convergence of domest ic-to-world inflation and
interest rates will not be prevented , the length of the disequilibrium per iod will be increased considerably, because,
in the short run, mone tary disequilibrium affects not only
the balance of paym2nts but also the level of pr ices.

If

there are restrictions or barriers to the international
movement of capital , a black marke t for fore ign currencywi ll
be developed within the economy, and since the official ex change rate is fixed below the equilibrium rate, and an
excess demand for foreign money will be generated , this
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would lead to a higher rate of exchange in the black marke t .
The essence of exchange contro l is rationing.

In the

most extreme form of rationing , the governmen t assumes a
complete monopo ly of foreign exchange.

There can be no

l egitimate free market for the national currency , although
there may be a black market in which the currency is bought
and sold illegally.

Among those who have worked in the area

of exchange res trictions is Mario I . Blejer (1978) , who used
the annual data for Brazil, Columbia , and Chile , and showed
that the black market exchange rate appears to be signifi cantly affected by current and one - year - lagged excess supply
of money .

Blejer concluded that almos t all ex ante money

marke t f low disequilibria are transmitted to the black mar ket rate within a two - year per i od .

The work of Bleger can

be found in Frenke l and Johnson ' s Economics of Exchange
Rates (1978) .
The modern revival of the monetary approach may be said
to have begun in an i mportan t bu t ind irect sense with James
Meade ' s (1951) and Johnson ' s

(19 77 ) work on the genera liza -

tion of the theory of the balance of payments, and with Mundell 's (1968) concern with the theory of pol i cy mix on the
assumpt ion of international capital mobility, which empha sized the monetary nature of the balance of payments dise qu ilibrium, and in turn, led to the recognition that i n a
capital - mobi le wo rld , the central bank controls not the
money supply and employment but the d omes tic credit and the
balance of payments .
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CHAPTER III
THEORETICAL MODEL
Long Run Mode l
In this section we will analyze the long - run situation
of the Iranian balance of payments on the basis of the fol lowing assumptions :
1.

There is long - run full employment ,

2.

The country bein g analyzed is small (in the sense
that prices are exogenous . ) ,

3.

There are no barriers to the international movement
of capital and all goods are traded (i . e. , the do mes tic rate of inflation is pegged to the world),

4.

The money market is always in equ ilibrium,

5.

The exchange r ate is officially fixed.

On the basis of the a ssump tions , the following relation ships can be written :
Ms

a .H

(money supply equat ion)

(l)

Md

P.L(Y , i )

(mone y demand equat i on)

( 2)

Ms

Md

(equilibri um i n money market)

( 3)

where Ms is the domest i c stock of money , taken to be M (cur 2
renc y plus demand depos i t and time and savings accounts); a
is the mo ney supply multipl ier to be calculated by the ra ti o
of Ms over H; H i sh i gh - powered mone y , where H

=

R+D.

H re -

presents those funds expressly des i gnated as reserve by
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monetary authori t ies ; R is internati onal r eserves.

(Re -

serves are the fore i gn assets of the monetary authorities ,
which include Bank Markazi, the Fore i gn Exchange Funds, and
Treasury IMF accounts; D is the dome s tic credit componen t

of

the money supply , which includes central bank credit to the
pri v ate and g o v ernment sectors as well as open market operat i ons; Y i s real income , real GNP; i is the real rate of
interest

it is a prox y for all interest rates , and

changes in i re f lect similar mo v ements in domestic as wel l
as world rates; Md is the nom i nal demand for money; P i s t he
price level -- wholesale price index or GNP deflator .
Accordin g to Eq uation ( 3 ) , P . L(Y,i) = a.H , b y taking
the natural log from both side s and assum i ng tha t the demand
function is a constant elasticity function , we will get :
lnP + n y lny + n i lni + lna + lnH
where ny and ni are the

elasticities of demand for real

cash balances with respect to income and i nterest rate , res pect i v ely.

Differ e ntiating Equation (4) , with respect to

time y i elds :
d l n P + n y d lny + ni d lni
dt
d"t

d"t

dlna + d l nH

d"t

d"t

dlna + 1/H dH
dt

dt

d lna + 1/ H d (R+D )

d"t

dl n a + 1/

crt

~

dD
dR + 1/
H dt
H dt

19
or:
R/ H d ln R

----at

Equat io n

dlnP + n

dt
( 5)

y

dlny + n. dln i - d l na - 0/H dlnO
~
dt
dt
----at d t

( 5)

can be written in the follow ing way:

R/H gR = gp + n y gy + n.~ gi

-

ga - 0/H go

( 6)

where g 's a r e t he rates of growth of s ubs cripted var iables;
notice that Equation (6) is the reduced form of t he system.
For estimating Equation (6) , the fo llowin g endogenous
and exogenous va ria b les a re used :
exogenous var i ab les a re gp ' gy , gi , 0/H g 0 a nd ga.
endogenous variable is R/H gR .
Equa ti on (6) states that the rate of grow th of inter national reserves is determ i ned by growth in the supply of
money under the cont r ol of monetary author iti es , whi c h is
represented by gp ' gy ' and g i.
Equat i on (6) will be estimated in the following form :
(R /H ) gR = B1 gp + Sz gy + SJ g i + B• ga + Ss(O/H)g 0 +e(6')
and an OLSQ method will be appl i ed to es timate t he coeffi cients , where e is the stochastic disturbance .
Previous s tatistical work , Magee ( 1 97 6 )

· i mplie s that

S z shou l d be o f the order of magn it ude of un it y , 6 3 should
be a small negative number , and Bs shou l d be nega ti ve and
clo se to un it y.

However , if, fo r instance, S s is signifi -

can tl y less th an one, it may i mp l y specificati on error rather
than a refutation of the monetary approach .
p oints out tha t th e reason th a t we ge t

Magee (1976)

such good results

from the quarterly da ta ba se d on a long - run model with so
many stringent assumpt i ons is pa rtl y because of , rather than
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in spite of, the preceding assump tions .

The small country ,

long-run ful l emp lo yement assumptions allow empiricists to
assume that y , p , and i are exogenous and unaffected by the
suppl y o f money .

But if they are not exogenous , OLSQ es ti-

mates of Equation (6) lead to a simultaneous equat i on bias ,
i. e ., the true value of the parameter differs from the mean
of the sampling distrib u tion of a given est i mato r.

This

d i ffe rence is , for any g i ven pa rameter , a fixed va lue which
may or may not be equal to zero .

The direct i on of the b i as

is i mportant in order to know wh ether we are considering
th a t y , p , and i are affected by supply or demand for money .
However , since we started with the assumption that y , p, and
i are exogenous , we would have no problem on this subject .
Consider the causation the other way .

An exogenous

increa se in reserves, which incr ea ses real income, should
i nc rease p rices and redu ce interest rates .

Thus, without

proper spec i fication and estimation, it is not known whether
the coefficients in Equation ( 6) reflect the demand for
money or the effects of the supply of money on y , p, and i.
Second , a 1% increase in D will not lead to a 1 % de crease in R if some money demand variables are excluded from
Equation (6).

For example , the increase in D will lead to

a deprec i ation of the (excluded) foreign exchange rate when
the latter is within the band set by the exchange authori ties.

This absorb s some of the excess supply of mon e y so

that reserves do not fall by 1 %.

Magee cont i nues by i mp ly -

ing that a 1 % increase in D not only wi ll not lead to a 1 %
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decrease in R if the central bank sterilized reserves inflows ,
but will a lso lead to a magn i f ication effe ct on reserves .
If ther e is an exogenous increase i n the home demand
for money , that is caused , for example , by incr eases in
world and hence domestic prices , then reserves will flow in .
If the mone t ary authorities partiall y sterilize reserves,
reducing domest ic credit by some fraction of the reserve i n flo w, then home money demand is still unsa tis f i ed and more
reserves will f low i n .
The above mode l represents a long - run situa tion in
which mone t ary i mba l an ces do not ex ist since any change in
mo ney market would be felt in the balance of paymen ts ( i . e . ,
the reserve

compo~ent

of the monetary base would change) .

In other words, the supply of money is instantaneously ad justed to the demand for it, because the residents of the
count r y can ge t rid of or acqu ir e money e ither through the
international market for commodities or through the internat ional securities mark et .

The long - run model does not

include var iations of the v ariable such as official and
blac k marke t exchange rates a nd the domest ic rate of inflation , because the long - run model assumes that domestic price
lev el is exogenous and a ll goods are traded.

Therefore , the

d omestic rate of inflation is pegged to the world, and if
the official exchange rate depr eciates by a rise in the
wor ld price l eve l, it would only be temporary because the
flow of reserves and proper domestic mone tary poli c y will
correct the exchange r ate in the long run.
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However, the theory assumes that in the short run, mon etary disequilibrium affects not only the balance of payments
but also the le vel of prices (domestic and foreign) and hence
the black market exchange ra te.

Th is assumption is made on

the basis that in the short run the main assumption of the
theory is that the domes tic price le vel is not pegged to the
world and there is an exchange restriction in the economy
which would result in a black market for foreign money .
Therefore , in order to analyze the change in the above variables, and to be able to build the theoretical block for
the short-run dynam ic part of the model , the following
assumptions are made :
1.

Country is small.

2.

Internat ional price of its traded goods is exogenously determined and allows for the existence of
non - traded goods , defined as those whose price
responds, at least in the short - run , to domestic
mone tar y disequilibrium .

3.

The exchange rate is officially fixe~.

4.

There is full employment .

5.

Real income is exogenously determined and monetary
d isequilibrium does not affect the rate of growth
of real income , since according to monetarists, in
the short-run mo netary changes primarily affect
output .

In the long - run, however, the rate of

mone tary g rowth primarily affects prices; therefore ,
there is always a lag between the effect of ·
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monetary imbalances on output and prices , Friedman
(1970) .

Thus , it appears that real income (Y/P = Y)

is exogenous , since it takes a very long interval
of t i me to feel the change i n y .
6.

Domest ic inflation is a geometrically we i gh t ed
average of the rate of change of the price

of

traded and non - traded goods , where prices of traded
goods are determined by the world rate of inflation
and by variations in the offic i al exchange rate.
The pr ices of non - traded goods a re determ i ned by
the prices of traded goods and mo netary excess
demand throughout the economy .
7.

There exists an exchange control in the economy ;
therefore, the excess demand for fore i gn money
created by exchange -rationin g has to be satisf i ed
from t he black market for foreign exchange , where
th e black market ra t e i s determ ined solely by
supply and demand .

8.

The money market is always in equil i brium.

Note that in assumpt i on #6 , the h i gher the share of
non - traded goods to traded go ods in total expe nd it u re , the
slower the speed of adjustmen t to mone tary i mba lances .
fol lowi ng explana ti on clarif ies this point .

The

From equili -

br i um , let th e monetary au t ho rities increase the money
supply; the i mpa ct effect is to create an excess supply of
money and an exce ss demand fo r both fore i gn (traded) and
domest i c (non - traded) goods .

The excess demand for fore i gn
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goods is reflected i n an excess demand for fore i gn exchange ,
and the money supply wi ll tend to decrease as the authori t i es sell foreign exchange to stabilize the exchange rate .
In the end, full equilibrium will be re - establ i shed when the
money supply has returned to its orig i nal level , with inter national prices and domestic prices unchanged .

However ,

there will have been a transitory increase in domestic goods
prices.
The length of time it will take for the system to return
to equil i brium depends part l y on the extent to which the
excess demand for fore i gn exchange and , hence , the balance
of payments and the rate of change of money supply i s affect ed.

To the extent that part of the excess supply of money

is absorbed by a rise in the price of domes t ic (non - traded)
goods , the excess demand for international goods will be
smaller than it otherwise would be.

Therefore, we expect

the rapidity with which the system adjusts to a monetary
disturbance to be directly related to the ratio of traded to
non - traded goods , even though the final equilibrium is no t,
(i.e . , the following relation holds : PNT/PT + AeAg where
stands for the rate at which the relative prices re s pond to
a monetary gap , and g

=

(yO * + a * - Md*) where Md *

=

rr + md* ,

i.e. , the ex ante relat i ve change in the money supply minus
the relative change in money demand .
The follow i ng equat i ons correspond to the as s umpt i ons
made above :
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Ms

a .

~

P .

(R+D)
~

where md = f(y , i ) (real demand for money).

Definit i ons of

the variables and equat i ons are the same as before . Con tin u ous equil ibri um in the money market i mp les th a t supply of
mo ney is equal to demand for money , he nce :
a .

(R+D)

=

P . md

Tak i ng the natural log from both s i de s and express in g the
variab l es in terms of their pe rcentage rate of change will
y i eld :
a * + R/H R* + D/H D*

n + md *;

or :
a* + (1 - y ) R* + y D* = rr + md *
where (*) is the percentage rate of change of the var i ab l e ,
rr is the domes tic rate of in f l a tion , y is the D/ H factor of

proport i onal ity , and md is the demand for real cash ba l an ces .
According to assump tion *6 , the price level is a geome trically weigh ted average of PT ' t he price of t raded goods
and PNT ' the price of non - traded goods , tha t is:
P

=

PTS . PNT (1 - S)

where S is the share of traded goods in total e xpend itur e .
By t a king the na t u ral log of the above equ a tion and
expressin g the var i able s in terms of the i r p ercentage rate
of change , we wi ll get :
rr = S

PT

+ (1 - S) P*NT

and a ls o :

( 8)
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( 9)

wher e p 0 is the official exchang e rate and nw is world inflation .
Now since:
Ae il g , and by taking the natural log from both sides :
ln PNT - lnPT = lnA

il g

and d ifferentiating it totally :
d ln PNT - dlnPT = il dg or:

*
PNT

* + il d(g) or :
PT
+ a*

n - md * )

( 10)

where A is the elasticity of relative prices to monetar y
imbalances .

Since the elements in g are in terms of their

percentage rate of change , in order to capture the past ef fects o f monetary i mbalances we use the technique of d i ffer enc e operator (d) i.e ., for an y v ariable dx

=

xt - x t - l "

Substituting Equations (9) and (10) into (8) and then repla c in g f or n in Equation (7) y ields:
rr t= 6 n
wt

(ll)

+ 6p * +(l - 6 ) ( y D*+a* - md * )t - (l - 6 ) ( yD*+a* - md*) -( l - 6 )nt - l
0
t
t-1

which expresses the domestic rate of inflation as a funct i on
of world inflation , percentage rate of change of the official exchange rate, current and lagged ex ante excess flow
supply of money , and past rate of inflat i on .

To der i ve the

ba lanc e of payment s equation , we substitute Equation (1 1 )
f or TI in Equation
*
e
R = 1 -ey TI
+ 1- y
t
wt

( 7)

which y i elds the follow i ng:

*
Po t

-

6
- 11 -- y8
1 - y r; t
gt - 1

-

1- 6
1 - y n t -1

( 12)
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which expresses the flow of reserves (balance of payments)
as a function of world inflation , changes in the rate of
official exchange

rate, current and lagged excess flow

supply of money , and past rate of inflation .

(Refe r to the

appendix for the derivation of the equations . )
Note that if B = 1, which implies that all goods are
traded ( international), then

e

un it y and the domestic rate

of inflation in a fixed exchange rate system is pegged to t he
world .
In order to analyze the black market for foreign mon ey,
we set up the following:
Supply of foreign exchange into the black market comes
from two sources:

(1) over - invoicing of imports and under -

invoicing of exports -- the'main source;

(2) discrepancies

between the official marke t and the black market , which
bring the supply of foreign money to the black market from
tourists .

Since over - invoicing and under - invoicing play an

i mportan t role in the divergence of foreign exchange from
the official market to the black market , some more explana tion in this area seems appropriate .
Suppose an importer whose new factory has been sanc tioned , or approved officially , arranges with a foreign
supplier to sell him equipment at a fict i tious invoice price,
higher than the price he actually pays .

Presentation of the

f ictitious invoice to the foreign exchange authorities
en titles the i mpo rter to buy the full amount of foreign
exchange at the official rate to make payment.

The portion
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of the invoiced amount that represents overpayment is then
deposited by the supplier to the importer ' s account in a
foreign bank and , because of the disequilibrium rate (i.e .,
official vs . black market rate), it can be sold for rials at
the higher black market rate , thus provid ing the importer
with a profit .

The deception of over - invoicing, of course ,

is inevitable because the government has made it illegal for
anyone to trade foreign exchange openly between the official
and the black ma rkets .
The ma in incentive for engaging in over - and under invoicing is provided by the differential between the offi cial and the black market rates .

The greater the differen -

tial , the larger the profit possibil iti es and the higher the
incenti v e for

defeat in~

the system .

This leads to a d i ver -

sian of transact i ons from one market to the other which even
a comprehensive control network may not be able to stop.
Discrepancies between the official and the black - market
rates also increase the supply of foreign exchange to the
black market by tourists because the differenti al tends to
spur the flow of vis itors to the country .
Therefore , we can postula te the following supply func tion of fore i gn exchange to the black market :
logs fe = c + a log ( pB)
(13)
8
1
( Po )
fe .
where s
~s the supply of foreign exchange to the b lack
8
marke t and p 8 is the black market exchange rate .

Demand for

black market exchange comes largely from illegal tourist
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expend itures and trans fers of capital and remittances abroad.
As with the demand for domestic currency , the demand for
fore i gn currency at a given le vel of income is positively
related to the return derived from holding this asset , and
negatively related to the return derived from holding alter native asse ts .

Foreign exchange which is acquired through

the black ma rket may be used to buy fore ign assets .
The nominal return for holding those assets, namely the
fore i gn nominal interest rate, also has to be considered as
part of the return from the purchase of foreign exchange .
Since the alte rnative to holding foreign assets is to hold
domes tic ones, the "opportunity " cost of buying fore i gn
exchange will be the nominal return on domestic assets, i.e.,
the domestic and foreign nominal interest rates are domin ated by var iations in the expected rate of inflation, the
dema nd func tion for fore i gn exchange in the black marke t wi ll
be specified as follows :
logD fe = c + b
8
2
where

[ ( p * ) e + rr we] - d rr e
8

( 14)

D~e is the demand for foreign excha nge in the black

market , b is own - return elasticity , d is alternati ve cost
elasticity , and rr e and rrwe

are the expected domestic and

world rate of inflaction, respectively, and ( p;)e is the
expected black market depreciation .

According to assumption

#7 , wh ic h implies that t he black marke t

rate is determined

solely by its supply and demand and that they are always in
equilibrium , the following can be written:
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( 15)

Since

(p

* )e

8

in Equat i on (14) is unobservable , in order

to obtain a proxy for this var iable, we postulate that people
form their e xpectations about future exchange rates by u sing
information about the past behavior o f prices and exchange
rates.

If the black ma rket exchange rate is allowed to be

freely determ i ned by market forces , the rate of depreciat i on
will probably closely fo llow the tren d of the relative damestic inflation rate relati ve to foreign inflation .

However,

discrepancies between ac t ual black market depreciat i on and
relative inflation ar e typical .

Such d iscrepancies may

result from a variety of causes , mainly official intervention a nd other interference with the free functioning of the
market .

If, any any ti me , people observe that domestic

prices have risen faster t han foreign pr i ces and that the
increase in the relative domestic price exceeds that in the
black market exchange rate , they will expect black market
depreciation to equal observed disc r epancy between the two
va riables.
Fi gure 1 i l l ustra t es this po i nt .
initial rat i o ,

Starting from an

let the natural log of the black market ex -

change rate ( p ) at t
8

0

be 4 . 30 wh i le the natural log of the

domestic price index (P) i s 4 . 3 7.

This implies tha t the

domestic price level has appreciated 7% more than the black
market exchange rate and , and

asslli~ i ng

for s i mpl i c it y a zero

rate of inflation abroad , a 7 % black market deprec i ation i s
ca l led for in order to bring both prices back to the i r
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initial ratio.

Moreover, people are apt to consider that

any expected excess of domestic over foreign inflation will
also be transmitted , at least partly, -to the exchange rate.
It follows that the expected rate of depreciation of the
black market exchange rate at t

0

is 7% in addition to the

expected rate of differential inflation in the coming period.
From this analysis we obtain the following formulation
as the empirical proxy for t he expected black ma rket depre ciation.

lnP

4

t ime

Figure l.

The time path of the domestic price level
and the black market exchange rate.
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(logP-logPW - logp

8

)+k(1T

e

e
- 11w )

( 16)

whe re P and PW are the re l evant domest ic and foreiqn pr i ce
indexes, k is the proportion of expected relative inflation
which people expect to be transmitted to the black market
exchange rate du ring the coming period.
Now , by substituting Equation ( 16 ) fo r
tion (14) , and assuming that b

=

d and k

=

( p;)e in Eq ua 1, we come to the

fo llowing relationship:
log Dfe
B

c + b(log P - log

Pw -

( 17)

log P l
8

By d ifferentiating Equations ( 1 3) and (17) and also
operating upon the assumption that su pp l y and demand for
fo reign exchange in the black ma rket are i n equil i brium , and
ma nipul a ting the variables , the following can be derived:

(18 ' )

wh ich fo rmulates the rate of ch ang e o f the black marke t
exchange rate as a func ti on of wor l d inflation, d e va luation
(revaluation) of the official exchange rate , current and
lagged exce ss flow supply of mone y , and pa st per iod of damestic ra te of inflation.

(Se e appe ndi x fo r

the derivation

of Equat i on 18).
Equations (11),

(12) and (18) express the current rate

of inflation , reserve f lows, and the rate of change of the
b l ac k market exchange rate as functions of world inflation,
percentage rate of change of official exchange rate, current
and lagged ex a nte excess flow supply of money , and past
inflation.

By success i ve substit u tions for 1T t - l in Eq ua tions
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(11) ,

(12) , and (18), we can get the following equations :
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The above equat i ons express three dependent var iabl es , n t, Rt* ,
and pB t' which are functions of the same independent (expla natory) variables i n which their coefficients are dis trib u ted geometrically into the past .
Equations ( 11' ),

(12 ' ) , and (18 ' ) indicate that the

current rate of domestic inflation, reserve flows, and the
current rate of change of the black marke t exchange rate may
be estimated as a weighted average of a po lynominal of cur rent and lagged rates of world i nfla ti on , official exchange
rate , and ex ant e excess flow supply of money .

The poly -

nominals a re exponent i ally dec r eas i ng and the weights are
functions of the elasticity of the relative p rices (traded
and non - traded) wit h respect to the e x ante excess flow s up ply of money (A ) and of the share of tr aded goods in the
total expenditure (S) .
As was stated above, the main purpose of t h is study i s
to measure the effect of a mone t ary d isequ ili brium on the
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balance of payments, domestic rate of inflation, and the rate
of change of the black market exchange rate; therefore, in
order to show the importance of the ex ante excess flow
supply of money in the determ ination of these variable s, we
will set up the following restrictions .
First of all we will concern ourselves only with the
cur rent world rate of inflat ion.
inflation rates

Assume that past world

have already been i ncorporated int o the

current one.
Second , since the off icial exchang e rate is fixed , the
rate of change of the current exchange rate, by itself,
would in dica te the past behavior of the exchange rate .
Finally, since a moneta ry imbalance in this periodwould
overlap into the next period , and since the main purpose of
this study is . to measure th e effect of the monetary disequi libr i um, it is reasonable to assume that there is current
and lagge d ex ante excess flow supply of money , and to assume
that the effect of further lags are incorporated i n one per iod of lagged monetary disequil ibri um.
Given the above restrict i ons , the final forms of the
equations are as follows:

tll " I

"'

Rt =6

p8,t,.

0

....

'1fw

6~

t

*

•

*

*

+S 1 P + SdYD +a -md ) t+ SJ(yO +a - md lt _ 1 + £t 2
ot

trwt+
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Equa ti ons (11 '' ) ,

(12 '' ) , and (18 ' ' ) wou l d be estimated

si mult a neousl y us i ng ord i nar y least squa re method for es ti mation .

Note that in Chapter V the three equations ha v e been

estimated accord ing to their importance in this study
firs t

Equa tion (12 ' ' ) , then (18 '' ) , and last (11 ' ' ) .

36

CHAPTER IV
EMPIRICAL RESULTS:

THE CASE OF IRAN, 1968-1977

The models presented in Chapter II are tested here with
quarterly data for Iran covering the period from 1968-1977 .
The long - run balance of payments equation is tested for the
Iranian economy using three quarters of the moving average
of quarterly data in order to get a smooth trend for all the
variables .

The estimated equation was tested on the basis

of theoretical background contained in the monetary approach
to the balance of payments.
During the years analyzed here, Iran passed through
periods of inflation , mainly durlng the seventies , and its
balance of payments and ' the black market exchange rate for
foreign money had some unexplained fluctuations.

The main

objective of this discussion of empirical results is to make
estimations of the determinations of the rate of change of
the foreign reserve flows, the black market exchange rate,
and the domest i c rate of inflation as a function of the
elements presented in the theoretical model .

The principal

element for those estimations i s the ex ante excess flow
supply of money (g) , and its calculations will be based on
the estimations of the demand for money as explained below.
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The Demand - For-Money Function
The demand - for - money funct ion needs to be i nvestigated
in order to es timate the elasticities necessary to calculate
the parameters of the ex ante excess flow supply of money .
The general form of the relationship is;

~
p
where
tion.

=

f(y ,i)

is the particular defin iti on of the money in quesIn the case of Iran , j is 2 , which describes the

money supply as currency plus demand depo sits plus time and
savings account ; P is the price index, which is taken to be
the wholesale price index and is used to deflate the nominal
balances .

The alternative cost of hold i ng money (discount

rate) is represented by i .

The savings and time accounts

are interest bearing accounts (9 percent during the period
studies), highly liquid , with no time required for withdraw al; y is real GNP.
To get a direct estimation of the elasticities , the
logarithm i c form of Equation I is used :
I'

As was ment ioned above , y is the current gross national product deflated by the who l esale price index, and i is the
nominal interest rate .

The reason for using i a s the dis -

count rate is that since a good part of domes tic savings and
investment is d i ver te d to unorgan ize d markets where interest
as h i gh as 48% may be charged , and since the discoun t rate
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represents interest on short-term bills and promissory notes
which are held by the Iranian Central Bank for loans to
commercial banks, it seems that i is a good proxy for the
alternative cost for holding money .

Table 1 reports the

results of the regression estimations for the constant elas ticity money demand function

(Equation I ' ) where the defla -

tor used is the Who l esale Price Index.

TABLE 1
MONEY DEMAND EQUATION - IRAN, 1968-1977, ANNUAL DATA
(USING W.P .I. AS DEFLATOR)

Variables

Coefficients
1. 24

Constant
(

0

1. 28

965)

Real Income

1. 06
(10 .99 )

Interest Rate

-1.05
( -1. 90)

R2

.968

D.W .

1. 56

S.E.R.

.117

Degrees of f.

S.E.

. 096
0

70

7

All the coefficients are estimated by OLS me thod.

The

t- va lues are in parentheses below the coefficients .
In general , all of the estimated coefficients are s i g n i ficant at the .05 level (except the constant term) and
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hav e the correct sign.

In particular , the income elasticity

is highly significant and is not different from unity at the
9 5 % and 99 % levels .
The income elasticity implies that for a given percent age increase in real income, Iranians have increased their
time and saving deposits

by the same percentage as they

have increased their demand deposits and currency holdings .
By u sing the estimated elasticities we can generage
observations about real c ash balances demanded , so we will
be a ble to get the main element of the previously stated
equations , i.e., ex ante excess flow supply of money.
For the purpose of estimating the model, we need to
analyze the money supply process in Iran.

The investigation

involves the determination of the relationship ~etween highp owered money (base) and the money supply, i.e., a study of
the size and the v ariability of the money multiplier and the
r elationship between the base and its source.
The monetary effect o f a change in high - powered money
can be predicted only if the money multipl ier

~s

stable.

The money multipl ier appears to be stable in Iran during a
10-year (40 quarters) analysis.

Monetary authorities in

Iran u se measures that directly control the
sion of the money supply.

~ult i ple

expan-

Two measures frequently used

which affect the money multiplier are:

(a) minimum reserve

requirements and ( b) maximum credit volume.
Bank Markazi Iran has used several types of required
reserve ratios.

Commercial banks have , at one time or
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another , been required to maintain (1) minimum liquidity
ratios on the basis of th e ir liquid asset s,

(2) minimum de -

posits wi th Bank Markaz i, and (3) minimum holdings of
ment securities as part of reserve requirements.

gover~

Reserve

requirements have appl i ed to demand depos its as well as to
savings and time depost i ts.

In 1976 and 1977 the ratios

ranged between 25 and 30 percent for demand depos its and 1 2
and 15 percent for time and savings accounts .
To support the measures described above , Bank Markazi
Iran has set credit ce i lings on the lending of commerc ial
banks .

This regulation has been used frequently to impos e

limits on the vo l ume of credit that banks could extend to
the private sector.

The credit ceiling for 1 975 and 1976,

for example, was 40 percent above the level during 1974 and
1975 .

The ceiling for 1973 was 30 percent above that for

the preceding period.

This is perhaps the most direct mea-

sure that Bank Ma rkazi can use to clamp d own on the expan sion of money , provided that enough pressure is exerted on
banks not to exceed the prescribe d l imi ts .
The rate structure in the organized financial mark et
is determined for different purposes and maturities.

As of

Sep t ember 1976 , for example , the bank ' s own red i scount rates
were eight percent for commercial papers and seven pe rcent
for "productive " loans, loans that were supposed to make a
particularly high contributi on to the econ omic development
of the country without substantially raising the to tal
amount of credit outstanding .
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The interest charges to specialized banks, as well as
the interest rate on the government's own direct loans to
these banks, was six percent .

In turn, the interest rate on

loans by specialized banks for agricultural investments was
seven percent, and the interest rate on loans for i ndustry ,
contruction, and export was nine percent.

The short~term

interest rates charged by commercial banks were limited to a
maximum of nine percent for export financing , 11 percent for
h igh priority activities, and 13 percent for others.
As mentioned earlier in this chapte r , the monetary
effects of changes in high - powered money can be predicted
only if there is a stable relationship between the base and
the money supply.

One way of testing this relationsh i p is

to estimate statistically a regression of the high - powered
money and currency deposit ratio on the money supply.
In order to get a direct estimate of the elasticit i es ,
the log - linear fo r m of the equation is used .

It includes

claims on foreign assets, on government, on official enti ties, and on commerc i al banks.

CP is currency over demand

deposit of the non - bank publ i c.

This regress i on equation

would be estimated by the OLS method .
The estimated regression is :
In M
2
R

2

=

=

.

97

1.33 + . 79BH - . 292CP
(4.62) (15.49)
(- . 625)
D . W.

= 1.58

In parentheses are t - values.
is currency- deposit ratio .

S.E.R. = .137

H is high - powered money and CP
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The est imated elasticity of money supply with respect
to high-powered money is highly significant and close to
unity , implying a stable relationship between the money supply and high-powered money , which further implies a stable
multiplier.

The t-value for the currency- deposit ratio in-

d icates that this variable does not significantly explain
the var iations in money supply.
The results show only that the monetary changes of
high-powered moeny can be predicted.

However, it does not

in any way affect the outcome of the final estimation.

On

the other hand, since these results are not going to be used
anywhere else , it would not have made any difference if the
above equat ion had not been estimated.
The Sources of Monetary Base
The main sources of the monetary base are (a) the foreign assets of the Bank Markazi: gold, fore ign exchange,
subscription , and shares in international agencies, including the IMF quota subscription minus drawings," and (b) the
claims of th e Bank Markzai on the treasury, the publicly
owned financial institutions, and the private banking sector.
These claims are the majority of the domestic assets of the
Bank Markzai Iran, and are defined as "domestic credit" in
the estimates in the next chapter.

Included in the claims

of the Bank Markazi on the government are government secur ities, loans, and credit granted by Bank Markazi to commercial and specialized banks which are government sponsored
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banks .
Bank Markazi iss ued several types of securities over
the period studied , short-term securities for a three-month
to one-year period, with an interest of 8 .7 4 to 9.07 percent;
intermediate securities for two to four years , with a rate
of return ranging from 9.67 to 1 0 .48 percent; and long-term
securit ies for five to seven years with an interest of 1 0.73
to 11.23 percent.
In the next chapter , Equations (6') , (11 ' ' ),

(12 ' '),

and (18'') are estimated using the estimated money demand
equat ion for the generation of ex ante excess flow supply of
money.

Equation (6 ' ) is es timat ed by the OLS method.

tions (11'' ) ,

Equa-

(12 '' ), and (18' ' ) are estimated simultaneous-

ly by using the OLS method .
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CHAPTER V
BALANCE OF

PAY~1ENTS ,

BLACK i'lARKET EXCHANGE

RATE , AND DOMESTIC RATE OF INFLATION
The ma in objective of this chapter is to present an
ana lysis of the long - run Iranian balance of payments and of
the dynamic responses of reserve flows, black marke t exchange
ra t e , and domest ic rate of inflat i on to changes in the variables considered to be important in the theoretical consi derations discussed in Chapter II .

Spec i fically , the main

purpose will be to estimate Equations (6 ' ) ,

(12 '' ) ,

(18 '' ) ,

a nd ( ll '' ) .
Long - Run Balance of Payments
The estimated long - run equation for the balance of pay ments Equat i on 6 ', Table 2 , shows that growth in the domes tic price level increases the reserve inflows with respect
to the monetary base .

The s i gn of the estimated coeff i cient

for the ra t e of i n t eres t

(e las t i c i ty of demand for re a l cash

balances wi th respec t to ra t e of interest) is negat i ve as i t
becomes , as expected , the s i gn of the money supply mult ipl i er coefficient .

The s i gn of the elast i c i ty of demand for

real cash balance s with respe c t

to i ncome i s positive , as

was expected and as t he t heory pred i cts; however , it does
not seem to be close to un i ty even t hough it is not s i gn i-
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ficantly different from zero .

*

*

A perman ent income series should product a larger lT.ag ni tude .
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TABLE 2
LONG-RUN ESTIMATED BALANCE OF PAYMENTS EQUATI ON
USI NG THREE QUARTERS MOVING AVERAGE* OF
QUA RTERLY DATA FROM 1 9 6 8-1977
Eq ua tion ( 6 ' )

v aria bles

coef= i c i ent

Pri c e

Inc ome

S . E.

1. 0 2
{ 2.62)

. 391

.2 6 6

. 214

( 1, 24)

Inte r e st Rate

Mone y Supp ly
Mul t iplier

R

""

D. H.

.1 87

-. 573

.1 57

(- 3 . 64 )

Domestic Compo nent
o f th e Mone y Base
2

-. 314
( -1. 6 7 )

. 021
11. 1 9 )

.183

. 385
2

S. E. R.

1 . 09 5
=

. 039

De g rees of f.
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By implying moving averages, an attempt may be made to
eliminate passing fluctuations and to arrive at values
that define the influence of the steady operating secular
factor . When a trend is to be determined by the method
of moving averages, the average value for a numbe r of
years, quarters , or months is secured , and this average
is taken as the normal trend value for the unit of time
falling at the middle of the period covered in the cal culations of the average. Mills (1956)
** The t-values of estimates are given in parentheses below
t he coe ffi c ients.
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In order to check the significance of the income
elasticity coefficient , two tests of the hypothesis have
been conducted , one for the magni t ude of the i ncome elasti city and one for the sign of it.

In the first case we fa il-

ed to reject the null hypothesis that income elasticity is
in the magn itude of unity at 5 % level of significance; how ever , in the second case we rejected the null hypothesis
that income elasticity is negative .
The coefficient of the domestic compo ne nt of the mone tary base , as can be seen, is positi ve and is not sign i fi cant .

This implies that domes tic credit creation , contrary

to the theory , does not have a n y significant effect on the
balance of payme nts.

However , this might be inter preted to

mean that while changes in domestic assets can be controlled
by Bank Markazi , effective control of the public sector ' s
share is dependent on government fisca l pol icy .

Substant i a l

foreign exchanges received by the treasury through increased
oil revenues and deposited in Bank Markaz i would have the
immediate effect of increasing the net fore ign assets of the
banking system .

I f the government convert s these assets

into local currency for domestic use , the assets will have
the double - barreled effect of increasing domestic liqu i d ity
and setting the stage for mul tiple expansion of the mone y
supply .
ha lt

The mon etar y authorities have a limited ability to

these

exogenous

i ncreases in

the

supply

of
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money.

*

The significance of the coefficients of the rate of

interest and money supply multiplier implies that these do
have significant power in explaining the variat ions in the
Iranian balance of payments.
Dynamics of the Iranian Reserve Flows,
Black Market Exchange Rate ,
and Domestic Inflation
Equations (12 '' ) ,

(18 ' ' ) , and (11 '' ) in Chapter II have

been simultaneously estimated using the method of two - stage
leas t

square for estimation.
The estimated reserve flows equation (Equation 12'' ,

Tab le 3) implies that an increase in the world rate of inflat ion is assoc i ated with reserve inflows , so does an ex change rate deprec i ation e v en though they are insignificant.
However , the current ex ante excess flow supply of money
would result in a deterioration in the balance of payments .
The past value of monetary imbalances have little effect on
current values of the reserve flows .

The coefficient of gt

is highly sign i ficant at .05 level, but coefficients of p
and nw are not s i gnificant .
values of monetary

0

This would mean that current

disequilibrium do explain the current

This phenomenon , which is a recent feature of the o i l
producing economies also o cc urs in certain developed countries as they experience massive inflo ws of dislodged
short - term funds (i.e ., " hot " money) .
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mone t ary situation, as do the past values of the variable ,
bu t

less significantly .

A f ix ed official exchange rate

could affect the balance of payments only temporaril y after
it depreciates or appreciates .
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TABLE 3
SHORT- RUN ESTIMATED RESERVE FLOW EQUATION WITH ONE
QUARTER LAGGED EX ANTE EXCESS FLOW SUPPLY OF
MONEY US I NG QUARTERLY DATA FOR 1968 - 19 77
Eq ua tion (12 '' )
Rt* = B rr
+ 8 1 p * +Bz( yD *
+*
a - md * )t+B,( yD* +a * - md * )t - l+ E: t
ot
2
o wt

coefficient *

S .E .

World Inflation

.712
(. 926)

. 769

Official Exchange
Rate

l . 55

2.01

Variables

( . 768)

Ex Ante Excess Supply
of Money (gt)

-1. 20

gt-1

-. 354
( - 1.52)

R

2

=

D. W.

. 238

(-5 .07)

• 23 3

.508
1.97

S . E.R. = .124
Degrees of f .
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The t - va l u es of the estimates are given in parentheses
below the coefficients .
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The black market exchange rate equation (Equation 18 ' ' ,
Table 4) makes it obvious th a t
s i g ni f ic ant .

none of the coefficients are

This i mp lies that var iations in p

explained by the variables in the mode l .

8

are not

That is to say, the

mo netar y approach is incapable of explain i ng the change s in
the b lack market exchange rate.
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TABLE 4
SHORT- RUN ESTIMATED BLACK MARKET EXCHANGE RATE
EQUATION lHTH ONE QUARTER LAGGED EX ANTE
EXCESS FLOW SUPPLY OF MONEY USING
QUARTERLY DATA FOR 1968-1977
Equation ( 18' ' )

Coefficient *

Var iables

World Inflation

-.151

S.E .

.128

(-1.17)

Official Exchange Rate
(

.154
456)

- . 022
(

-

0

0

. 039

525)

.063
61)

.039

(l.

R

2

=

D. W.

.2 70
2.40

S.E .R. = . 020
Degrees of f.

*

337

0

35

The t - va l ues of the estimates are given in parentheses
below the coefficients .
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None of the coefficients except gt -l are significant at
. 05 level ; however , the coefficient of nw becomes signifi cant at .1 level.
By looking at R 2 , we see that it is low.

This further

implies that 70% of the change in the black market exchange
rate is due to the factors outside the model and that only
30 % of the variations in p
v ar i ab les.

8

can be explained by the stated

Ano ther factor which contributes to the low sig-

nificance of coefficients and lower R2 is that M definition
2
of money is used .
The last of the three simultaneously estimated equations i s the domestic rate of inflation (Equation 11' ' ,
Table 5) .

The coefficient of world inflation is pos iti ve ,

highly significant , and close to unity, further justifying
the assumpt ion that Iran is a price taker in the international marke t .

The coefficient of the official exchange

rate is positive and significant , which implies that any
deprec iation of the exchange rate would result in a higher
rate of inflation; however , the current and one quarter lag ged ex ante excess flow supply of money would have an upward
pressure on the level of prices .

As can be seen, the coef -

ficients of monetary disequilibrium are again not s i gn ifi cant at . 05 level , implying that monetary imbalances do not
explain mu ch of the pr i ce va riations in this case as opposed
to the explanatory power of the official exchange rate and
of world inflation .
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TABLE 5
SHORT-RUN ESTIMATED DOMESTIC INFLATI ON EQUATION
IHT H ONE QUARTER LAGGeD EX ANTE EXCESS
FLOW SUPPLY OF MONEY USING QUARTERLY
DATA FOR 1968-1977
Equat i on ( ll ' ' )

Coefficient

S.E.

World Inflation

. 934
(5 . 51)

.169

Off icial Exchange
Rate

l. 31
( 2. 98)

.44 4

gt

.002
( . 046)

.052

gt-1

.025
( . 434)

.051

Var iabl es

D.W.

2 . 15

S.E.R. = .027
Degrees o f f .
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Acco rding to the monetary approach to the balance of
payments theory, the short - run effect of monetary disequ ili brium will fal l more heavily on the domestic pr ice level and
less on the ba lance of payments, the h i gher is A (the elastic i ty of relative pri ces to monetary i mba l ances) and t he
lower is the share of traded goods ,

B.

However , as can be
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seen from the estimated coefficients , the short-run effect
of monetary disequilibrium has fallen more heavily on the
balance of paymen ts and less on the price level and on the
black marke t exchange rate , i mply in g that A is low a nd 6 is
h i gh .

The theory also implies that the lower is A and the

higher i s 6 , the lighter is the effect of world in f lation on
the balance of payments and the heavier on the domes tic rate
of inflation .
This hypothesis is just i f i ed by the estima te d coeffi cients and their sign i f ican ce for world inflation in both
the balance of payments and the domestic in flation equat i on .
Since A is low , the implication is that the domestic rate of
i nfla tion is less affected by domestic monetary imbalances,
as is the

price of non -traded goods.

However , a low A also

implies that part of the ex ante excess flow supply of money
created by the d omest ic expans ion ary moneta r y policies is
absorbed by a rise in the prices of domes tic (non-traded)
goods ; therefore , the speed at which the system adju sts to
mo netary i mba lances i s directly related to the share of tra ded and non - traded goods in the total expenditure.

We thus

expect a higher coefficient for world inflation than ex a nte
excess flow supply of money in the equa tion for domestic
inflation .
In the short run, the gov ernment can reduce the i mpac t
on the balance of payments of a g i ven monetary policy by
imposing heavy restrictions on international transactions of
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go ods - reducing

B and reducing the impact of monetary dis-

equilibrium on the balance of payments during the transition
period.

These measures, however , can only delay the full

impact of the monetary changes on the balance of payments
until the adjustment process is completed, and the delay of
the impact will undoubtedly be accomplished at the cost of a
higher rate of inflation during this adjustment period .
Blejer (1977) suggests that for a given change in the
ex ante excess flow supply of money , countries with high \
and low

B at the same time may experience a higher rate of

inflation and a stronger balance of payments.

This implica-

tion of the theory , however , applies only to industrialized
countries , since in a small country like Iran with a higher
share of traded goods to non - traded goods . (high S ), and less
response of the relative price level to monetary imbalances
(low \ ), the effect of monetary imbalances falls more heavily on the balance of payments, and the effect of world inflation falls more heavily on domest i c inflation.

On the

basis of this explanation, we expect countries like Iran to
have a higher domestic rate of inflat ion and a weak balance
of payments .

Note that the preceding analysis does not hold

fully for the changes in the black market exchange rate,
since as was noted earlier, much of the var iation in pB i n
Iran are due to the factors outside the model, such as
unlicensed transactions of "hand" payments which cannot be
traced.
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Now consider an exchange rate devaluat i on; when the
exchange rate is devalued (for example the rial / dollar rate
in Decembe r 1971 by 8.5 %), the equilibrium in the goods market is altered as the relative prices of traded goods i n crease (Equatio n 9) .

At the same t i me , a stock disequili -

brium is created in the money market as a result of a de cline in the real value of the cash balances held by the
public.
Equat i on 12 states that as a result of devaluation and
a state of disequ i l i br i um , there would be an inflow of re serves and, accord i ng to Equat i on 11 , a h i gher domestic
rate of inflati on .
short- run .

These results are only t ransitory and

When subs ti tutions in product i on and consumption

equilibrates the goods market , and the i nflow of reserves
restores the stock equilibrium in the money market , the ef fec ts of the devaluation are completed and prices will con tinue to rise at the world rate while t he rate of change of
foreign exchange reserves will return to i ts previous level .
Devaluation of the official exchange rate narrows the
gap between t he demand for and the supply of foreign re serves .

Because the domest i c price level r i ses as a res -

ponse to the official exchange rate deprec i at i on , the
narrowing of the gap u l t i mate l y results i n an incr ease in the
black market exchange rate by a smaller percentage.
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CHAPTER VI
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
It is obvious from the reported results that there are
d eficiencies in some of the emp irical findings of th is study
as far as the significance of some of the estimated coeffi cients is concerned.

Nev ertheless , this should not imply

that the model is incompatible with the analysis , since some
of the results were expected prior to the testing because of
the unav ailability and lack of re liable data .

Also , because

of the small sample properties, the insignificance of some
of the coefficients at .05 l evel does not reduce the explanatory powe r of the theory and the mode ls that have been
adopted , and further i ndicates t hat the ma in purpose of this
study has been accomplished and that the find i ngs are compa tible with the real situation of the economy under cons i der ation .
In the next few pages a brief summa ry and some conclud in g remarks are presented which a nal y ze the accuracy of the
obtained resul ts .
In the theoretical pa rt of this study , a model is pre ,sented to analyze the i mpact of externa l influences and of
domestic monetary d isequ ili brium on the balance of payments,
black market exchange rate , and domestic rate of inflati on
of a small economy (Iran) opera ting under a system of fixed
exchange rate .

The main depar ture of this model fr om other
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presentations of the monetary approach to the balance of
payments i s the analysis of the simultaneous effect of an ex
ante excess flow supply of money (monetary imbalances} on
these endogenous variables .
The central emphasis of the theoretical inquiry is that
in a small economy with a fixed exchange rate, increasing
the

domestic credit component of the monetary base at a

rate that is too fast in relation to the growth of its de mand for money wil l result, in the short - run , in a rate of
inflation higher than that of the rest of the world.

In the

longer run, however, if the d if ference between the supply
and the demand for money is kept at a constant

rate , the

complete excess supply of money created ex ante by the mone tary authorities will be eliminated through the balance of
payments , and domestic in f lation will converge to the world
rate .
If the exchange authorities devalue the domestic cur rency , the result will be a higher rate of inflation in
relation to the rest of the world.

The balance of payments

will improve, but only after a transitional periodofadjustment.

The price level will continue to rise again at the

rate of the outside world and the flow of reserves will revert to its previous d ir ec tion and rate .

The exact path and

length of the adjustment will depend on the assumpt ions
about the behavior of the monetary authorities following the
devaluation, but in all cases the transitional character of
the effect of a one - time devaluation are preserved .
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In the empirical part of this study, the experience of
Iran between 1968 and 1977 is evaluated .

Two kinds of models

(long-run model and short-run dynamic model) are presented .
The estimated long - run balance - of-payments equation justi f i es the hypothes i s th at is based on the theoretical mode l,
in which P , y , and i are exogenous .

The long - run reserve

flow equa tion was estimated with three quarters of the mov ing
averages of quarterly data , which shows the expected results
except for the positive sign of the coefficient for domestic
credit.

Th is should not imply , however , the refutation of

the monetary approach , but rather th at the a ss umption that
changes in the Iranian balance of payment s occur because of
fac tors outside the model , and that monetary authori ties do
not have substantial control over the flow of thei r interna tional reserves .
In the short - run, three equations (reserve flows , b l ack
market exchange rate, and domestic rate of inflation) were
evaluated .

In the first part of the estimation , a distr i-

buted lag mode l with ex an t e excess flow supply of money
having one lag period (quarter) was used .

This la g struc -

ture was used in order to see the effect of the previous
mone tar y imbalances on the balance of payments , th e black
market exchange rate , and domestic inflation .

The estimated

coefficients and elasticit ies show that domest ic monetary
disequilibr i um has fal len more heavily on t he balance of
payments and les s on the price level (and thus on the black
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market exchange rate) because of the reduced responsiveness
of the relative prices to domestic monetary imbalances (low
A)

and a high ratio of traded to non - traded goods (high 8).
Estimated Equation (12 ' ' ) implies that if the monetary

authorities increase the domestic component of the monetary
base (to create an ex ante excess flow supply of money) too
quickly in relation to the growth of the demand for money , a
balance of payments deficit will result .
The behavior of the rate of inflation and the black
market exchange rate was analyzed in the framework of the
theoretical mode l.

The inflation rate, as measured by the

wholesale price index , is si gn ificantly explained by exter nal inflation (as measured by the rate of price change in the
United States) and by var iations in the official exchange
rate .

In both cases (rate of inflation and the black market

exchange rate) , the results indicate that the adjustment of
pr ices to internal mone tary imbalances is completed in a
shorter period than is the adjustment to external influences.
Ano ther finding is that, since the fixity of the official
exchange rate has created a black market for international
reserves , much of the variations in the black market rate is
explained by factors outside the model.

This i ndicates that

the monetary approach is incapable of explaining the var i a tions in the rate o f the black market exchange.
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Appendix A
A Graphical Interpretation of Supply and Demand
For the Black Market Exchange Rate
If there are not controls on deal ings in foreign cur rencies , the free market for foreign exchange will absorb
all the demands and supplies of foreign exchange.

In this

particular case, the imposition of, for example , a tariff in
the abse nce of exchange controls creates incenti ve for smug gling, but does not create incenti ve s for the creation of a
black market for fore i gn exchange .

However , the following

geome tric analys is deals with the creat ion of a black market
and the respect i ve supply and demand functions .
In F igure 2, the amount of foreign

~xchange

supplied

and demanded per period (FX) is represented on the horizon tal axis and the exchange rate is the number of units of
domes tic currency (rial) per un it of foreign exchange
(do llar).

s1

is the total supply curve of foreign exchange,

including both the capital and current account supplies, in
the absence of any exchange control .
for foreign exchange .

o1

is the demand curve

It is derived by a horizontal summa-

tion of the curves D and Dk , representingthecurrent accoun~
and a constant capital outflow demand in terms of local currency (rial), respectively (assuming that cap ital outflows
local currency are independent of the exchange rate) .

Equi -

librium in the foreign exchange market in the absence of
exchange control and government i ntervent ion occurs at E ,
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and the equilibrium exchange rate is pe (for deta iled assum ptions on the ela sticiti es of supply and demand , see Sheikh

(1976) .
Suppose the government now follows a fixed exchangerate policy and sets the exchange rate officially below pe ,
such as p c in Figure 2 .
0

Mone t ary authori ties are thus

draw i ng down fore i gn exchange reserves to mee t the excess
demand (ab) .

At p

c
0

.

the government has two opt1ons to cor -

rect the disequ ilibri um :

(1) devalue the currency , or (2)

t o retain the pegged parity and i mpose strict exchange con trol .

Under such an exchange control system , the mone t ary

authorities a r e assumed to ban all capital outflows and dis tribute whatever foreign exchan ge supplies are avai l ab le to
those who demand foreign exchange for curren t account tr ans act i ons at t he pegged rate .

The excess demand for foreign

exchange for capital outflow may seek out another source of
supply (black market) .
In the pre sence of a black market for fore i gn exchange ,
there would be two foreign exchange rates :

pc

0

'

wh ich is

offic i a ll y pegged and pB ' which is the black market rate . In
Figure 2,

s2

is the supply of fore ign exchange showing total

supplies, offic i al as well as black market, as a function of
t he black marke t rate pB.
left of

s1 ,

This curve is everywhere to the

because with exchange control, capital inflow in

the form of d irect investment may be discouraged since for e i gn i nves tors are uncertain about whether they can take
th eir prof its or principal out of the country.

Thus , even
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F i gure 2.

Derivation of the supply curve of fore i gn
exchange in the black market .
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if the o ff icial exchange rate aftr the establishment of
exchange control remains at p

c
0

,

.
the exlstence of exchange

control may dec rease total supplies of foreign exchange from
a to d in Figure 2 due to a d ecrease in capital inflow .

S

0

shows the supplies of for eign exchange for the officia l mar ket as a func tion of the black marke t rate .

It is negat i ve -

l y sloped because as the black ma rket rate , p , rises , given
8
the of f ici al rate p c , exporters will be temp ted to d i vert
0

more and more of their foreign exchange earnings from the
off i cial to the black marke t.
There is another source of supply of foreign ex change
for the black market, and that is from overinvoicing of im por ts by domestic residents, due to the overval uat ion of the
exchange rate (for further discuss i on of over-invoicing and
unde r-in vo icing of exports and imports and smuggling , see
Bhagwati (1974) .

This is indicated by the curve TNd , which

is drawn to show that i f the black market r a t e is the same
as the of fic ial rate, i. e ., p c , the proportion of total
0

official supplies over - in vo iced is zero , but the proportion
rises as the black market rate rises rela tive to the officia l

rate .

Whe n the black market exchange rate rises to T,

over - inv oicing is again zero , because officially d istri buted
foreign exchange for i mports is zero.

Thus , at any black

market exchange rate, given the offic i al rate pegged at p c ,
0

the supply of foreign exchange to the black market is equal
to the total supply of fore ign exchange at that rate (given
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s,

fX

Figure 3.

Derivation of the demand curve for foreign
exchange in the black market.
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by the curve ,

s2 )

minus the supply of foreign exchange to

the official market (given by 5°) plus the supply to the

s0

black market from over-invoiced imports (given by
TNd curves) .

By subtracting TNd from

s2

minus

at every black mar -

ket rate we will get SB , the black market supply curve of
foreign exchange , which gives us the supply of fore i gn ex cha n ge in the black market as a function of the black ma rket
rate, given that the official rate is pegged at p c .
0

Because of exchange control , and in the absence of any
risks in dealing on the black marke t, the demand for capital
outflow now blocked by exchange control (Dk in Figure 2) is
the potential demand for foreign exchange shifted to the
black marke t.

Before the imposition of exchange control,

the total foreign exchange supplied was enough to satisfy
current accoun t demand for foreign exchange ( p ca Figure 2) .
0

With excha nge control , however , official supplies are
not enough to satisf y current account demand for foreign
exchange .
In the black market, there is an addit ional potential
demand for foreign exchange .

Gi ven p c as the officially
0

pegged exchange rate , at the same black market rate the tot al supply of foreign exchange in the off ici al market deter mined from 5° cur ve is p cd (Figure 3) , which is less than
0

p ca , the amount demanded of fore i gn exchange from exchange
0

control authorities .

Given the black market rate , pB

=

p c,
0

the potential demand for FX in the black market for current
account transactions is p cf (which is equal to da) , the
0

72
demand l eft unsatisfied in the official market .

If , because

of the risk involved in deal i ng in the black marke t, not all
the unsat i sfied (excess) demand turns up in the black market
(as suming that the exchange cont rol does not change consumer
behavior so that the supply and demand curves do not shift)
c. '
c
and if the proportion which turns up is given b y p f /P 0 f,
0

f ' would be a point on the demand curve for FX in black mar ket for current account transactions.
Now assume that the black market rate i s given by p .
8
Then , p cg of FX is supplied to the offic i al market .
0

Out of

this , gg ' is received by demanders for over -i nvoicing i mports , thus leaving p cg' to satisf y the demand for fore i gn
0

exchange f or current account transactions.
is the potential demand in the black marke t.

The

amo~ nt,

ag ,

To de termine

the point on the black market demand curve for the rate
p , we ha v e to know the demand at the marke t rate .
3
point , p c, let ag '
0

=

From the

p cm; ag ' decrease s as a funct ion of
0

the black market exchange rate.
How this unsatisfied demand , p cm , decreases in the
0

black market for higher black market rates depends upon the
behavior of those operating in the black market .

This, in

turn , depe nds upon who is turned away from the officia l mar ket because of limited supplies of FX there.
fa ctors which determine this:

There are two

(1) the fo r m of rationing of

the limited amount of foreign exchange i n the official mar ket, and (2) the possibility of resale of the FX acqu ir ed
from the exchange control authorities.

Let us assume for
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simplicity that there is no resale of FX .

If we assume that

there is a neutral d istribution of the limited amount of FX
amoung appl icants , then the response of those left u nsatis fied in the official market to the black marke t is a proper
fraction of the demand curveD (Figure 3) , at every black
market price of foreign exchange.

The locus of t ho se points

would be curve km (Figure 3) - - a t every price of FX , this
neu tr a lity assumption mea ns that the elas ticity of dema n d on
this curv e , km , wi ll be the same as the correspondi ng elas ticity on the D curve, g i ve n the assumption of no re sale .
In the abs ence of any risks, the demand for foreign ex -

'
change in the black market at the black market rate PB'
will then be pBy .

If th e re is risk involved in dea ling on

the bl ack marke t, the demand for FX appearing in the black

' will be a fract i o n of pBY
' wh ich is g i ven
market at rate pBy
by km ' , the fract ion g i ven by p c f ' /p c f , so that PB , the
0

black marke t demand for FX, is p ~y'

0

(i . e . , p ~y , / p ~Y

=

p~f ' /

By joining the points, k , y ' , and f', we get black
mark et demand cur v e ky ' f ' for current account - transactions .
Curve ky ' f ' is positively sloped at a range because an
increase in the black market rate has two effects.

First ,

it decreases the offic i al supplies of foreign exchange , thus
d i v erting g reater excess demand to the black market ; s e cond ,
the h i gher black market rate directly decreases demand for
fo re i gn exchange .

As long as the first effect is stronger

than the second , an increase in the black market rate wi l l ,
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by increasing the black market demand, make the demand curve
positively sloped.
We know that Dk in Figure 2 represents the potential
demand for capital outflows in the black market.

If a frac-

tion of the demand that appears in the black market is
represented by Dk

1

(Figure 4), the tota l demand curve for

FX in the black market is derived (Figure 4) by adding ky ' f'
to ok , which is o 8 . The equilibrium in the black market
1
8
occurs at E and the equ ilibrium black market rate is p ~.
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Figure 4 .

Supply and demand curv es for the black market
foreign exchange.
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Appe n dix B
Mathematical Derivation of Equations for Balance
Of Payments, Dome stic Rate of I nflation
And Black Market Exchange Rate

g = (YD * +a·- n- mct'"J
we have :
a
'iT

(1 - ylR •

+
=

+yO

=n

( 7)

+ md *

8 p '" T + (1 - S )P:T

( 8)

(9)

PNT = P; + ).d(yO* +a

(~)

From

and (9::

-

(10)

Md * )

n - SPT = 11 - 6 ( n.,., +o:)

•

( 1 - !l}PNT ,.. n - SPT = PNT = ~

Substituting for n in (10):
+p

11

"" B (n..,. + o
= n ..., +

o~

)
0

0

- n -md* l

+ Ad(yO

+ (1 - 8) ( nw +

p~) + ).

(1-S)d(yD *

+a

-

w-md

)

+ (1 - S l l. d(yo '" +a ·- mct '" ) - >.(1 - S) ,...:.>.( l - slll't- l

or:
rr

(1

+ .\

{1 - sl ) =n w +

o~

+

11-B l>, d ('(D * .. a

~(1 -G l

- md * ) -

t-1

(1 - 6\(yo '" +a '"-mct '" )

-(1- 0 Jrr

t-1
For black market exchange rate:
acco rding to supply of and demand for black market rate
d log

S~e= a(d log De - d log o0 l

ll

(ll)

t-1
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and:

oe'e

d l og

= b (d log p - d l o g

{S~el *

Since at equilibrium

_ b_
"'

_

(D;e ) • then:

( '

b

Substituting for
,
Pa =

?w - d log esl

we ge t:

lf ,

_b _ ( efn + 0 • )
a + b
w 0

+ (1 - 0 ) dg- (1 - S l rr

-n
t.-1

\..

w}

- "- o'
a + b

o

p . ,., ~ _ _
b _ ) lf + , ~+
Q
.. +
(l- 9 )bdg-b(l - 6 ) lf
c + b
a-+- 1:
11
a ,. b
~ J 0o
~b
~ t-1
Fo r

(18)

the balance of payment equ at ion, substitute Equation (11)

into Equation

R•

_

1_

fo r

(7)

11 ,

.,

so we get:
•

•

•

)

( enw+9o 0 +(l - 9)d(yD +a - md lt_ 1 - (l - 9)llt - 1 -

1
(YD . +a :md* l
!='"Y

1-Y

•

9

.R = ~

-

~
1-y

1-

y

( 1'1 ...,

*
1 - 9 ( {YO +a -md l
+o0 ) + ~
t

:r t - 1- -

1

-

(yD ~ +a ~ md • )·

t- )
1

(y D.+a*- md * l

1- y

~ gt.

1 - a
1- a
~gt-1 ~ 11 t - 1

( 12 )
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